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Understanding the dynamics of computer virus (malware, worm) in cyberspace is an important problem that has attracted
a fair amount of attention. Early investigations for this purpose adapted biological epidemic models, and thus inherited the
so-called homogeneity assumption that each node is equally connected to others. Later studies relaxed this often-unrealistic
homogeneity assumption, but still focused on certain power-law networks. Recently, researchers investigated epidemic mod-
els in arbitrary networks (i.e., no restrictions on network topology). However, all these models only capture push-based
infection, namely that an infectious node always actively attempts to infect its neighboring nodes. Very recently, the concept
of pull-based infection was introduced but was not treated rigorously. Along this line of research, the present paper inves-
tigates push- and pull-based epidemic spreading dynamics in arbitrary networks, using a Non-linear Dynamical Systems
approach. The paper advances the state of the art as follows: (1) It presents a more general and powerful sufficient condition
(also known as epidemic threshold in the literature) under which the spreading will become stable. (2) It gives both upper and
lower bounds on the global mean infection rate, regardless of the stability of the spreading. (3) It offers insights into, among
other things, the estimation of the global mean infection rate through localized monitoring of a small constant number of
nodes, without knowing the values of the parameters.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Kephart and White [Kephart and White 1991; 1993] initiated the study of computer virus dynamics
by adapting certain homogeneous biological epidemic models [McKendrick 1926; Kermack and
McKendrick 1927; Bailey 1975; Anderson and May 1991; Hethcote 2000] where each individ-
ual has equal contact to the others. Recently, researchers (mainly statistical physicists) weakened
the homogeneity assumption by considering spreading in heterogeneous networks, but mainly fo-
cused on spreading in power-law networks (cf. [Moreno et al. 2002; Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani
2001; 2002; Newman 2003; Barrat et al. 2008]). Very recently, computer scientists investigated the
modeling of spreading dynamics in arbitrary networks (i.e., not just power-law ones) [Wang et al.
2003; Ganesh et al. 2005; Chakrabarti et al. 2008]. These models considered push-based spreading
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(attacks or infection), by which a virus always actively attempts to infect the susceptible comput-
ers. Push-based spreading (and thus these models) cannot accommodate pull-based attacks such as
“drive-by download” [Provos et al. 2007] that a susceptible computer can get infected by connecting
to a compromised website. This inspired researchers to introduce the more realistic push- and pull-
based models in [Li et al. 2007], which however conducted mainly a simulation-based study and
did not offer deep insights. This calls for a systematic and analytic study of push- and pull-based
epidemic spreading dynamics in arbitrary networks, which motivates the present paper.
Although it is intuitive that push- and pull-based spreading dynamics models can accommodate
attacks that are not captured by push-based models, one may still ask whether this is actually the
case. This is a legitimate question because the abstraction of push-based spreading may be able to
accommodate pull-based spreading as well (e.g., by attempting to adjust some parameters in push-
based models). However, it turns out not to be the case because pull-based spreading and push-based
spreading are two mechanisms that exhibit fundamentally/conceptually different behaviors. Specifi-
cally, pull-based spreading can accommodate the outside environment of a network in question (e.g.,
a compromised website does not belong to the network system in which the push-based epidemic
spreading takes place); whereas, push-based spreading cannot accommodate the outside environ-
ment. It therefore appears to be necessary to introduce a new type of parameter, called α, which
abstracts the probability that a node gets infected because of its own reasons such as accessing a
malicious website. As such, push-based spreading dynamics corresponds to the case of α = 0, and
push- and pull-based spreading dynamics corresponds to the case of α > 0. In particular, when
compared with the case of α = 0, in the case of α > 0 the spreading would never die out and the
dynamics is much more difficult to analyze.
1.1. Our Contributions
First, we present a general sufficient condition (also known as epidemic threshold in the literature)
under which the push- and pull-based epidemic spreading will become stable. This result supersedes
its push-based counterpart given by [Chakrabarti et al. 2008] (ACM TISSEC’08).1 In other words,
our sufficient condition is more general and powerful. We also give a more succinct variant sufficient
condition which, among other things, allows to tune (in a quantitative rather than qualitative fashion)
the model parameters so as to assure that the spreading will become stable. This has important
implications. For example, we can first force the spreading dynamics to become stable and then use
the global mean infection rate (i.e., the rate or portion of infected nodes) as an index to indicate the
overall security of a network and to support higher-level decision-making.
Second, we notice that it may not be always possible to force the spreading to become stable (e.g,
the cost may be prohibitive). When the spreading is not stable (which does not necessarily mean
there is an out-break in the setting of this paper with α > 0), it would be important to know what
are the worst-case and best-case scenarios in terms of the global mean infection rate. Towards this
end, we give upper and lower bounds of the global mean infection rate. The bounds are actually
applicable no matter the spreading dynamics is stable or not, and are heuristically tight in some
cases. Unfortunately, we are currently unable to precisely pin down the threshold above which the
upper bound would be tight, and below which the lower bound would be tight. Still, we note that
results related to non-stable scenarios are very difficult to obtain in general.
Third, we offer the following deeper insights that are, to our knowledge, the first of their kind
when considering arbitrary networks. When the spreading is stable,
— we show how node degree governs node infection rate;
— we give a condition under which the popular mean field approach is applicable to study push- and
pull-based dynamics in arbitrary networks;
1As a side-product, we point out an error in [Chakrabarti et al. 2008], by which their sufficient condition was mistakenly
claimed to be “necessary” as well. The details will be given in Section 4.1.
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— we show how the global infection rate can be estimated by monitoring a small number of nodes
selected in a certain fashion without knowing the values of the parameters and independent of the
size of the network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the related prior works.
Because our work is built on top of the concept/model of push- and pull-based spreading dynamics
introduced in [Li et al. 2007], we briefly review it in Section 3. In Section 4 we present some
sufficient conditions (i.e., epidemic thresholds) under which the spreading will become stable, and
present some upper and lower bounds on the global mean infection rate. In Section 5 we present
some deeper insights that are especially useful in the absence of certain system information. We
conclude the paper in Section 6 with open questions for future research.
2. RELATED WORK
The study of epidemic spreading dynamics on complex networks has become a hot topic. From
a Computer Science perspective, this perhaps has been catalyzed by the ubiquitous presence of
real-life networks, including social networks, Internet, and email networks. The study has been
inherently multidisciplinary, and researchers have investigated approaches such as Epidemiology,
Dynamical Systems, Stochastic Processes, Percolation Theory, Generating Functions, Algebraic
Graph Theory, and Statistical Physics. As such, a thorough and complete review of the literature is
clearly beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead, we here focus on a specific perspective, and
classify the most-relevant existing studies of computer virus/malware dynamics into the following
three generations. (Because our focus is not about immunization, we do not aim to discuss the vast
volume of literature in this subfield as well.)
The first generation, initiated by Kephart and White [Kephart and White 1991; 1993] and fol-
lowed by numerous variant studies such as [Zou et al. 2002; Zou et al. 2003], focused on homo-
geneous networks. Such homogeneous models essentially require the underlying communications
to form complete graphs. This is unrealistic because some computers (or IP addresses) are blocked
from accessing certain other computers (or IP addresses), and that malware spreading does not nec-
essarily exploit the fully random scanning strategy [Chen and Ji 2005]. Moreover, the spreading
process that exploits social networks (including email communication networks) are certainly not
complete graphs, but rather follows the social networks’ topologies.
The second generation focused on specific heterogenous (i.e., power-law) networks, for which
we refer to the most-recent excellent books [Barrat et al. 2008; Newman 2010] for a thorough
treatment on the topic and for the large body of literature. From a technical perspective, we here
highlight that there are mainly two approaches to tackling such heterogeneity. One approach is to
exploit the specific properties of the degree distributions, especially the Barabasi-Albert power-law
degree distribution and the affiliated preferential-attachment model [Barabasi and Albert 1999],
which however are not without limitations (see, for example, [Faloutsos et al. 1999; Willinger et al.
2009]). The large volume of research results in this widely known approach were nicely summarized
in the 2008 book of Barrat et al. [Barrat et al. 2008]. The other (perhaps less known) approach is to
exploit generating functions [Wilf 1994]. This approach has successfully made a connection to the
Percolation Theory [Callaway et al. 2000; Newman et al. 2001; Newman 2007] and has successfully
identified epidemic thresholds. Moreover, this approach is applicable to random graphs for a given
degree sequence (which can correspond to power-law distributions) as introduced by Molloy and
Reed [Molloy and Reed 1995; 1998]. A systematic treatment of this approach can be found in the
2010 book of Newman [Newman 2010].
The third generation considers arbitrary heterogenous networks. The earlier investigations fo-
cused on push-based spreading [Wang et al. 2003; Ganesh et al. 2005; Chakrabarti et al. 2008].
These investigations made a clear connection between the fate of push-based dynamical processes
in arbitrary networks and the algebraic properties of graphs (more specifically, the largest eigen-
value of the adjacency matrix). The present paper enriches the dynamical processes by considering
both push- and pull-based epidemic spreading — a concept first introduced in [Li et al. 2007],
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which however did not go deep enough analytically. To be more precise, the two papers that are
the predecessors to the present work are: [Chakrabarti et al. 2008], which presents the state-of-the-
art epidemic threshold in push-based model, and [Li et al. 2007], which introduced the push- and
pull-based model but without giving deep results. We will demonstrate how our results supersede
theirs.
Finally, we note that the epidemic spreading dynamics model considered in the present paper is
essentially the so-called Susceptible-Infection-Susceptible (SIS) dynamics in nature [Bailey 1975],
which are very different from gossip processes (e.g., [Demers et al. 1987; Karp et al. 2000; Kempe
et al. 2001; Kempe and Kleinberg 2002; Shah 2009]), which are essentially Susceptible-Infection
(SI) dynamics in nature.
3. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PUSH- AND PULL-BASED MODEL
We consider push- and pull-based epidemic spreading in complex networks, which are naturally
represented as graphs. Because any topology could be possible and we want to draw insights that
are widely applicable, we do not make any assumption on the networks’ topologies, according to
which the epidemic spreading takes place. In the rest of this section we review the push- and pull-
based model introduced in [Li et al. 2007].
Specifically, we consider a finite network graph G = (V,E), where V = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set
of nodes or vertices and E is the set of edges or arcs. Denote by A = [avu] the adjacency matrix of
G, where avv = 0 and, if and only if (u, v) ∈ E for v 6= u, we have avu = 1. The graph G captures
the topology according to which the spreading takes place, where u can directly infect v only when
(u, v) ∈ E. For undirected graph, let deg(v) denote the degree of node v in G. The discussion in the
paper focuses on undirected graphs, but can be adapted to the setting of directed graphs by replacing
deg(v) as the in-degree of v in directed graph G.
Consider a discrete time model with time t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At any time t, a node v ∈ V is either
susceptible or infectious. (In this paper, “infectious” and “infected” are used interchangeably.)
Denote by sv(t) the probability that v ∈ V is susceptible at time t, and iv(t) the probability
that v ∈ V is infectious at time t. The model invariant is sv(t) + iv(t) = 1 for any t ≥ 0.
Moreover, a susceptible node v may become infectious at a single time step because of push-
or pull-based infection, and an infectious node may become susceptible because of defense or
cure. This explains why our model is SIS (Susceptible-Infection-Susceptible) in nature, except that
it considers both push- and pull-based infections. To accommodate push- and pull-based spreading,
we use the following parameters:
— α: The pull-based infection capability, namely the probability a susceptible node becomes infec-
tious at a discrete time step because of its own activity (e.g., connecting to a malicious website
which may not belong to G).
— γ: The push-based infection capability, namely the probability that an infectious node u success-
fully infects a susceptible node v, where (u, v) ∈ E. In the case of undirected graph, it is natural
that γuv = γvu for all (u, v) ∈ E.
— β: The cure capability, namely the probability that an infectious node becomes susceptible at a
single time step.
The main notations used throughout the paper are summarized below.
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λ1,A, . . . , λn,A the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A of network graph G with λ1,A ≥
. . . ≥ λn,A (in modulus)
λmax(M) the largest eigenvalue (in modulus) of matrix M
M⊤ the transpose of matrix (or vector) M
sv(t) the probability that node v is susceptible at time t
iv(t) the probability that node v is infectious at time t
i¯(t) the global mean infection rate (or probability) 1|V |
∑
v∈V iv(t); i¯ =
limt→∞ i¯(t) is also used in the case the spreading is stable
i¯[t0, t1] the average of i¯(t) over time interval t ∈ [t0, t1]
〈r〉 the mean of random variable r
α the probability that a node becomes infectious at a single time step because
of pull-based infection
β the probability that an infectious node becomes susceptible at a single
time step
γ the probability that a susceptible node v is infected by an infectious neigh-
bor u where (u, v) ∈ E at a single time step
δv(t) the probability that a susceptible node v becomes infectious at time t+ 1
because of its infectious neighbors {u : (u, v) ∈ E} at time t
In the n× n identity matrix (i.e., ajj′ = 1 if j = j′, and ajj′ = 0 otherwise)
Figure 1 depicts the state transition diagram [Li et al. 2007], according to which node v ∈ V
changes its state. As in [Chakrabarti et al. 2008], we may assume that the (neighboring) nodes’
susceptible infectious
α + δv(t) - α · δv(t)
β
(1 - α)(1 - δv(t)) 1 - β
Fig. 1. The state transition diagram for node v ∈ V
states are independent. Then, at time t+1, v may become infectious because of pull-based infection
with probability α, or because of push-based infection with probability δv(t), where
δv(t) = 1−
∏
(u,v)∈E
[1− γiu(t)] . (3.1)
As a result, the master equation of the nonlinear dynamical system is [Li et al. 2007]{
sv(t+ 1) = [(1− α)(1 − δv(t))] sv(t) + βiv(t)
iv(t+ 1) = [1− (1− α)(1 − δv(t))] sv(t) + (1 − β)iv(t),
namely
iv(t+ 1) =
[
1− (1− α)
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1 − γiu(t))
]
(1− iv(t)) + (1 − β)iv(t). (3.2)
Note that the above master equation preserves the invariant sv(t) + iv(t) = 1.
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4. EPIDEMIC THRESHOLDS AND BOUNDS ON INFECTION RATE
In this section we address the following questions in the above push- and pull-based model.
— What are the sufficient conditions (i.e., epidemic thresholds) under which the spreading will be-
come stable without resorting to any approximation (which is often used for analyzing nonlinear
dynamical systems)? We address this question in Sections 4.1-4.2.
— Can we bound the node infection rate without requiring the spreading to become stable (Section
4.3)? Such results would be useful especially when it is impossible or prohibitive to “manipulate”
or force the spreading dynamics to become stable.
In addition, we will discuss the applications of these theoretic results (Section 4.4).
4.1. A General Epidemic Threshold
Unlike the push-based model, where α = 0 and thus limt→∞ iv(t) = 0 for all v is a trivial equilib-
rium state, we do not have such a leverage for push- and pull-based model because α > 0 and thus
it is almost always true that iv(t) > 0, meaning that the spreading would not die out. Although we
are unable to point out where the equilibrium state is, we show that there must be an equilibrium
state (i.e., existence) that is exponentially globally stable.
THEOREM 4.1. (a general sufficient condition under which the spreading will become stable)
Let [i∗1, · · · , i∗n] be an equilibrium of nonlinear dynamical system (3.2), H = diag[hv]nv=1 with
hv =
∣∣∣∣∣∣−β + (1 − α)
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
and the other parameters be specified as above. If
λmax(H + γ(1− α)A) < 1, (4.1)
then system (3.2) is globally exponentially asymptotically stable, namely that limt→∞ iv(t) = i∗v
holds for v = 1, · · · , n regardless of the number of the initially infected nodes.
PROOF. Let I(t) = [i1(t), . . . , in(t)]⊤. Then Eq. (3.2) indicates I(t+ 1) = f(I(t)) for some
continuous function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n. Since [0, 1]n is convex, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
[Yoshida 1971] says that there exists at least one equilibrium i∗ = [i∗1, · · · , i∗n]⊤, i.e.,
i∗v =
[
1− (1− α)
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)
]
(1− i∗v) + (1− β)i
∗
v, ∀ v ∈ V.
Let zv(t) = iv(t)− i∗v for all v = 1, · · · , n. Therefore, we have
zv(t+ 1) = −βzv(t) + (1 − α)
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)zv(t) +
(1 − α)
[ ∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)−
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1 − γiu(t))
]
(1− iv(t)).
Note that for each v = 1, · · · , n,∏
(u,v)∈E
(1 − γi∗u)−
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γiu(t))
= γ
∑
(u′,v)∈E
zu′(t) ·
∏
(u,v)∈E, u<u′
(1− γi∗u) ·
∏
(k,v)∈E, k>u′
(1 − γik(t)),
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we have
|zv(t+ 1)| ≤ hv|zv(t)|+
(1− α)γ
∑
(u,v)∈E
|zu(t)|
∣∣∣∣ ∏
(u,v)∈E, u<u′
(1 − γi∗u)
∏
(k,v)∈E, k>u′
(1 − γik(t))
∣∣∣∣
≤ hv|zv(t)|+ (1− α)γ
∑
(u,v)∈E
|zu(t)|.
Define the following comparison system
θv(t+ 1) = hvθv(t) + (1− α)γ
∑
(u,v)∈E
θu(t) (4.2)
with initial values θ(0)v = |zv(0)| ≥ 0 for v = 1, · · · , n. This implies that |zv(t)| ≤ θv(t) holds
for all v = 1, · · · , n and t ≥ 0. Let Θ(t) = [θ1(t), · · · , θn(t)]⊤. Then Eq. (4.2) has the following
matrix form:
Θ(t+ 1) = [H + γ(1− α)A] Θ(t), (4.3)
where A is the adjacency matrix of the network graph. Since the graph is connected, the matrix
X = H + γ(1 − α)A is irreducible and nonnegative. The Perron-Frobenius theorem [Horn and
Johnson 1985] says that the spectral radius of X is its largest eigenvalue in modulus. Therefore,
condition (4.1) implies that all eigenvalues of the matrix X is less than 1 in modulus. This implies
that system (4.2) converges to zero exponentially. Because |zv(t)| ≤ θv(t), limt→∞ |zv(t)| = 0
holds for all v = 1, · · · , n, i.e., limt→∞ iv(t) = i∗v holds for all v = 1, · · · , n and the convergence
is at an exponential pace. This completes the proof.
The above theorem says that when the sufficient condition is satisfied, the spreading will converge
to the equilibrium state (but not dying out) at an exponential pace, regardless of the number of
initially infected nodes.
Comparing the sufficient condition presented in [Chakrabarti et al. 2008] to ours. Our result
supersedes the sufficient condition for the case of α = 0 presented in [Chakrabarti et al. 2008]
because of the following corollary of Theorem 4.1:
COROLLARY 4.2. In the case α = 0, if
λ1,A <
β
γ
, (4.4)
the spreading dies out regardless of the number of initially infected nodes, i.e., limt→∞ iv(t) = 0
for all v = 1, · · · , n.
PROOF. Note that α = 0 and i∗v = 0 implies H = (1 − β)In in Theorem 4.1. So, condition
(4.1) becomes λmax[(1− β)In + γA] < 1, which is equivalent to 1− β + γλmax(A) < 1, namely
condition (4.4). Hence, the corollary holds.
While Corollary 4.2 corresponds to the sufficient condition given in [Chakrabarti et al. 2008],
meaning that our sufficient condition is strictly more powerful, the sufficient condition for the case
of α = 0 is not compatible with the more succinct sufficient condition for the case of α > 0
(presented in Section 4.2). This also illustrates why the treatment in the case of α > 0 is different.
Caveat: The conditions are sufficient but not necessary. [Chakrabarti et al. 2008] claimed through
their Theorem 2 that τ = 1
λ1,A
> β
δ
(in their terminology), which is equivalent to the above condition
(4.4), is also the necessary condition for the spreading to die out for the case of α = 0. Now we
point out that their proof is flawed and explain why. We use their terminology so that it is easier
to check against their proof, which is presented in Appendix A of [Chakrabarti et al. 2008]. Their
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proof strategy is to prove “if the spreading dies out, then τ > β
δ
.” As shown in the derivation
of their equation (A6), this requires to prove “if the system is asymptotically stable, then λi,S =
1− δ+ βλi,A < 1 for ∀i, where S = ∇g(~0) = βA+ (~1− δ)I.” This subsequently requires to prove
“if the system is asymptotically stable at ~P = ~0, then the eigenvalues of ∇g(~0) are less than 1 in
absolute value.” The proof of this claim was attributed to their Lemma 1, which however — as we
now point out — cannot get through because the lemma actually states the opposite, namely “if the
eigenvalues of ∇g(~0) are less than 1 in absolute value, then the system is asymptotically stable at
~P = ~0.” Therefore, the necessity proof in [Chakrabarti et al. 2008] is flawed.
Having pointed out the flaw, one would wonder whether it is possible to prove “if the system is
asymptotically stable at ~P = ~0, then the eigenvalues of ∇g(~0) are less than 1 in absolute value” or
“τ > β
δ
in [Chakrabarti et al. 2008] is indeed the necessary condition for the spreading to die out.”
It turns out not to be the case. Conceptually, for a nonlinear dynamical system, when the largest
eigenvalue of the Jacobin matrix at equilibrium equals to one exactly, it may not imply that the
system is not asymptotically stable. For example, consider a simple system
x(t+ 1) = x(t)− γ(x(t))2 (4.5)
with 0 < γ < 1/2 and x(0) ∈ [0, 1]. Since x(t) monotonically decreases and belongs to the interval
[0, 1] for all t, it must converge to a fixed point of the system. Since zero is the only fixed point of
system (4.5), we conclude that limt→∞ x(t) = 0. Even though the modulus of the derivative of the
right-hand side at zero is 1, the system converges to zero if the initial value is less than 1. In other
words, their condition (as well as ours) is sufficient but not necessary.
Having pointed out that their proof strategy for necessity cannot get through, one may wonder
whether the necessity can be proven with a different strategy. It turns out not to be the case, as we
show here with a concrete counter-example that a sufficient condition is not necessary in general.
Our counter-example below shows that (in our terminology) there exist graphs where the infection
rate can still go to zero when λ1,A = βγ , which immediately violates the necessity of the sufficient
condition. Let us consider a graph with only two nodes linked with a single edge. Then, we have the
following dynamical system to describe the infection rate:{
i1(t+ 1) = γi2(t)[1 − i1(t)] + (1− β)i1(t)
i2(t+ 1) = γi1(t)[1 − i2(t)] + (1− β)i2(t).
(4.6)
In this case, the adjacency matrix is
[
0 1
1 0
]
, whose largest eigenvalue in modulus is λ1,A = 1. So,
under the condition λ1,A = βγ , we have β = γ. Suppose 0 < γ < 1/2. Then, 0 ≤ i2(t) ≤ 1 implies
1− γ − γi2(t) > 0. Let c ∈ [0, 1] such that i1(t) ≤ c and i2(t) ≤ c at time t, we have γ − cγ ≥ 0
and thus
i1(t+ 1) = [1− γ − γi2(t)]i1(t) + γi2(t) ≤ [1− γ − γi2(t)]c+ γi2(t)
= i2(t)(γ − γc) + c(1− γ) ≤ c(γ − γc) + c(1 − γ) = c− c
2γ.
In a similar fashion we have i2(t+1) ≤ c− c2γ. Still considering the comparison system (4.5) with
x(0) = 1, we observe that i1(t) ≤ x(t) and i2(t) ≤ x(t) hold. From the reasoning above, we have
limt→∞ x(t) = 0. This implies that limt→∞ i1(t) = 0 and limt→∞ i2(t) = 0, which serves as a
desired counter-example.
4.2. A More Succinct Epidemic Threshold
The above sufficient condition is general but not succinct. This motivates us to present the following
less general, but more succinct, sufficient condition.
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THEOREM 4.3. (a more succinct sufficient condition under which the spreading will become
stable) Let m = max
v∈V
deg(v). In the case β < (1− α)(1 + (1− γ)m)/2, if
λ1,A <
α+ β
γ(1− α)
,
then the spreading will become stable regardless of the initial number of infected nodes.
In the case β ≥ (1− α)(1 + (1− γ)m)/2, if
λ1,A <
1− β + (1− α)(1 − γ)m
γ(1− α)
,
then the spreading will become stable regardless of the initial number of infected nodes.
PROOF. Let ψ = max
(
|1 − α − β|, | − β + (1 − α)(1 − γ)m|
)
, and the other parameters be
specified as above. Because
(1− α)(1 − γ)m ≤ (1− α)
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u) ≤ (1 − α),
we have
hv ≤ max{|1− α− β|, | − β + (1− α)(1 − γ)
m|}.
So, the largest eigenvalue of H + (1− α)γA is smaller than that of ψIn + (1− α)γA. Note that if
ψ + γ(1− α)λ1,A < 1, or λ1,A <
1− ψ
γ(1− α)
, (4.7)
then λmax[H + (1 − α)γA] < 1. This means, by applying Theorem 4.1, that the spreading will
become stable regardless of the number of initially infected nodes.
Observe that in the case β < (1− α)(1 + (1 − γ)m)/2, sufficient condition (4.7) becomes
λ1,A <
α+ β
γ(1− α)
.
In the case β ≥ (1 − α)(1 + (1− γ)m)/2, sufficient condition (4.7) becomes
λ1,A <
1− β + (1− α)(1 − γ)m
γ(1− α)
.
This completes the proof.
Comparing the sufficient condition given in [Li et al. 2007] to ours. [Li et al. 2007] also presented
a sufficient condition for the case α > 0, namely
λ1,A <
α+ β
γ
and λn,A >
α+ β − 2
γ
,
whereλn,A is the smallest (in modulus) eigenvalue ofA. However, in the derivation of their sufficient
condition they used the following approximation of Eq. (3.2)
iv(t+ 1) ≈ α+ (1− α− β)iv(t) + γ
∑
(u,v)∈E
iu(t),
which omits all the nonlinear terms and is therefore quite coarse.
In contrast, our sufficient condition given in Theorem 4.3 is derived without using any approx-
imation. As a result, our sufficient condition is advantageous because it is both more concise and
weaker. Our sufficient condition is more concise because it says that λn,A is irrelevant; whereas,
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their sufficient condition unnecessarily involves λn,A. Our sufficient condition is weaker because
when β < (1 − α)(1 + (1 − γ)m)/2, λ1,A < α+βγ implies λ1,A <
α+β
γ(1−α) but the latter does not
imply the former.
4.3. Bounding the Node Infection Rate
The above theorems state sufficient conditions under which the spreading will become stable. Be-
cause we are unable to compute the equilibrium state for α > 0, the next natural question is: Can
we bound the nodes’ infection rates? Now we address this question.
THEOREM 4.4. (Bounds of iv(t) regardless of the stability of the spreading) Let limt→∞iv(t)
denote the upper bound of the limit of iv(t), and limt→∞iv(t) denote the lower bound of the limit
of iv(t). Then, we have
limt→∞iv(t) ≤ θ
+
v and limt→∞iv(t) ≥ θ
−
v ,
where
θ+v =
1− (1− α)(1 − γ)deg(v)
min{1 + β − (1 − α)(1 − γ)deg(v), 1}
,
θ−v =
{
1−(1−α)(1−γν)deg(v)
1+β−(1−α)(1−γν)deg(v)
(1− α)(1 − γν)deg(v) ≥ β
((1 − α)(1 − γν)deg(v) − β)θ+v + 1− (1− α)(1 − γν)
deg(v) otherwise
,
with ν = min{1− β, α}.
PROOF. First, consider the upper bound. Because
iv(t+ 1) ≤ [1− (1− α)(1 − γ)
deg(v)](1− iv(t)) + (1− β)iv(t),
we have
iv(t+ 1)− θ
+
v ≤ [(1− α)(1 − γ)
deg(v) − β](iv(t)− θ
+
v ).
In the case (1 − α)(1 − γ)deg(v) ≥ β ≥ 0, there are two scenarios. If there exists some t0 such
that iv(t0) < θ+v , then we have iv(t+ 1) ≤ θ+v for all t ≥ t0. If iv(t) ≥ θ+v for all t, then
|iv(t+ 1)− θ
+
v | ≤ |[(1− α)(1− γ)
deg(v) − β]||iv(t)− θ
+
v |.
Because |(1 − α)(1− γ)deg(v) − β| < 1, we have
lim
t→∞
(iv(t)− θ
+
v ) = 0.
So, we have limt→∞iv(t) ≤ θ+v in both scenarios.
In the case (1− α)(1 − γ)deg(v) < β, we immediately have
iv(t+ 1) ≤ [(1− α)(1 − γ)
deg(v) − β]iv(t) + 1− (1 − α)(1− γ)
deg(v)
≤ 1− (1− α)(1 − γ)deg(v).
Therefore, in both cases, we have limt→∞iv(t) ≤ θ+v .
Second, consider the lower bound. Since 1 − (1 − α)(1 − δv(t)) ≥ α, we can conclude that
iv(t+ 1) ≥ α(1 − iv(t)) + (1 − β)iv(t). The fact iv(t) ∈ [0, 1] implies that the right-hand side
above is greater than ν. So, we have iv(t) ≥ ν. Thus, we have
iv(t+ 1) ≥ [1− (1− α)(1 − γν)
deg(v)](1− iv(t)) + (1 − β)iv(t).
In the case (1− α)(1 − γν)deg(v) ≥ β, we can rewrite the above inequality as
iv(t+ 1)− θ
−
v ≥ [(1− α)(1 − γν)
deg(v) − β](iv(t)− θ
−
v ).
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We observe that there are two scenarios. If there exists some t1 such that iv(t1) > θ−v , then iv(t) ≥
θ−v holds for all t ≥ t1. If iv(t) ≤ θ−v holds for all t ≥ 0, then
|iv(t+ 1)− θ
−
v | ≤ |[(1− α)(1 − γν)
deg(v) − β]||iv(t)− θ
−
v |.
Because |[(1 − α)(1 − γν)deg(v) − β]| < 1, we have limt→∞ |iv(t+ 1)− θ−v | = 0. Therefore, we
have limt→∞iv(t) ≥ θ−v in both scenarios.
In the case (1 − α)(1 − γ)deg(v) < β, we immediately have
limt→∞iv(t+ 1)
≥ limt→∞
{
[(1− α)(1 − γν)deg(v) − β]iv(t)) + 1− (1− α)(1 − γν)
deg(v)
}
≥ [(1 − α)(1 − γν)deg(v) − β]limt→∞iv(t)) + 1− (1 − α)(1 − γν)
deg(v)
≥ [(1 − α)(1 − γν)deg(v) − β]θ+v + 1− (1− α)(1 − γν)
deg(v).
Therefore, in both cases, we have limt→∞iv(t) ≥ θ−v . This completes the proof.
The inequalities we use to prove Theorem 4.4 indicate that when the actual infection rate is
significantly smaller than 1, the lower bound would be tighter; when the actual infection rate is
close to 1, the upper bound would be tighter. This heuristics is confirmed by our simulation results.
However, it is challenging to precisely pin down the infection rate threshold, above which the upper
bound is tight and below which the lower bound is tight. We leave this to future research, while
pointing out that a key difficulty comes from the fact hat the spreading may not be stable.
4.4. Applications of the Thresholds and Bounds
In addition to their theoretic significance, the thresholds and bounds have good applications, espe-
cially for quantitatively guiding the operation of tuning the parameters so as to achieve the desired
outcomes.
First, the thresholds can be used to guide the adjustment of parameters so as to make the spreading
stable. For this purpose, it is intuitive to decrease γ (e.g., by imposing a more thorough examination
on message packets) and/or α (e.g., by blocking access to potentially malicious websites), and/or
increase β (e.g., by deploying more powerful, and thus likely more expensive, defense tools). It
would be less intuitive that the defender can also seek to decrease λ1,A by deleting edges and/or
nodes. It would be far less intuitive that the optimal strategy is to delete edges/nodes so as to reduce
λ1,A as much as possible, rather than to delete (for example) the largest-degree nodes as noted in
[Chakrabarti et al. 2008]. In any case, how much adjustment is enough to assure that the spreading
will become stable? The thresholds (more specifically, the inequalities) offered in Theorems 4.1
and 4.3 can be used to answer such questions quantitatively. Moreover, if the costs incurred due
to the adjustment of parameters are known, then Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 also provide a basis for
cost-effectively adjusting the parameters.
Second, consider the case of α = 0. Suppose it is impossible or over-costly to make the spreading
die out (e.g., because the parameters α, β, γ, and λ1,A cannot be made arbitrarily small/large, while
assuring that the network remains functioning). This means that the conditions given in Theorems
4.1 and 4.3 are not satisfied any more. Even if the spreading might not be stable, we can still utilize
the bounds given in Theorem 4.4 to achieve some useful goals. On one hand, the upper bound can
be used to estimate the worst-case infection rate and, perhaps more importantly, can be used to
guide the tuning of parameters in the bound θ+v so as to reduce it as much as possible. Although it is
not necessarily a tight estimation of the infection rate, it still would be useful because we now can
control the worst-case infection rate under a desired level. On the other hand, the lower bound can
be used to estimate in a sense the best-case scenario. Putting the bounds together, we further get a
clue on how tight/loose the bounds are and, when the two bounds are close to each other, what is the
small interval in which the infection rate resides. Finally, assuming the relevant cost functions are
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known, the tuning of parameters can also be made cost-effective. Such quantitative guidance would
be always preferred to the qualitative intuitions.
Third, consider the case of α > 0, which means that the spreading would never die out. In this
case, even if we cannot make the spreading stable (similarly because it is either impossible or over-
costly in practice as in the case of α = 0), the above discussion on utilizing Theorem 4.4 to guide
the adjustment of parameters would be still applicable here. Moreover, as shown in Section 5.1, the
bounds hinted us to conduct some deeper analysis that leads to useful insights.
4.5. Confirming the Thresholds and Examining the Bounds via Simulation
We conducted a simulation study to confirm the analytical results by using two real-life complex
network datasets obtained from http://snap.stanford.edu/data/.
— Epinions online social network dataset: This is a directed graph corresponding to a real-life online
social network, where nodes represent people and arcs represent interactions between them. The
graph has 75,879 nodes and 508,837 arcs with average node in- and out-degree 6.7059, maximal
node in-degree 3,035, maximum node out-degree 1,801, and λ1,A = 106.53.
— Enron email dataset: This is a graph representing Enron’s internal email communications, where
nodes represent employees and arcs represent email messages. Unlike the Epinions dataset,
(u, v) ∈ E always implies (v, u) ∈ E in Enron dataset (i.e., the interactions between a pair
of nodes, if any, are always mutual), which allows us to treat it as an undirected graph. The graph
has 36,692 nodes and 367,662 edges with average degree 20.0404, maximal node degree 2,766,
and λ1,A = 118.4177.
Although not reported here, we note that both networks exhibit power-law degree distributions. The
reason of using these datasets is that push- and pull-based epidemic spreading could take place in
such networks.
Using the above datasets, we compare the simulation results (averaged over 500 independent
runs) of the global mean infection rate i¯(t) = 1|V |
∑
v∈V iv(t); the average (over all nodes) of the
results obtained from Eq. (3.2); the average (over all nodes) of the bounds given in Theorem 4.4.
The parameters are selected according to Theorem 4.3 so that the spreading will become stable.
In all cases, we let 20% randomly picked nodes be initially infected. For the sake of better visual
effect, we use higher resolutions for plotting figures whenever possible.
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Fig. 2. The case of Epinions dataset (β = 0.1 and γ = 0.004)
Using the Epinions network dataset, Figure 2 plots the comparison of two parameter scenarios, in
both cases the spreading will become stable. First, we note that the simulation result still oscillate a
little bit in Figure 2(b) because the y-axis resolution is very high (10−4). Indeed, we calculated
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Fig. 3. The case of Enron email dataset (β = 0.4 and γ = 0.001)
the standard deviations of the simulation results in both scenarios, and found that the standard
deviations are not visually noticeable (which explains why we did not plot the standard deviations).
We interpret (at least partially) this phenomenon as follows. Since the initial conditions are random,
the asymptotic limit of the infection rate, i∗v , supposing it exists, is a random variable. Hence, the
variance of the mean infection rate i¯ = 1
n
∑n
v=1 i
∗
v is:
var(¯i) =
1
n2
var
(
n∑
v=1
i∗v
)
≤
2
n2
n∑
v=1
var(i∗v).
If var(i∗v) is bounded from above by some positive constant, then var(¯i) converges to zero as
n→∞, namely as the size of the network goes to infinity. Hence, the standard deviation,
√
var(¯i),
converges to zero. This would at least partially interpret why the observed standard deviations are
very small. Second, even if in Figure 2(a) with α = 0.1, we observe that the lower bounds are
relatively tight. This in a sense confirms the aforementioned heuristics that when the infection rate
is far from 1, the lower bound would be relatively tight. Third, it is noted that the simulation results
and the model predictions are almost always lumped together.
Similar phenomena are observed in the case of Enron email dataset (Figure 3).
5. DEEPER INSIGHTS
In this section, we draw deeper insights related to the following three questions when the spreading
is stable:
— Does deg(v) govern i∗v = limt→∞ iv(t), namely what role do node-degrees play in terms of
determining the nodes’ infection rates (Section 5.1)?
— Under what conditions the mean field approach is reasonably accurate and thus applicable to
arbitrary networks (Section 5.2)?
— When the mean field approach is reasonably accurate, how can we exploit it to infer the global
mean infection rate through localized monitoring (Section 5.3)? This is especially important be-
cause it does not require knowledge of the parameters.
5.1. The Role of Node Degree on Node Infection Rate
Both the upper and lower bounds given in Theorem 4.4 are a function of deg(v). This suggests as
a special case that i∗v, the probability that node v is infected when the spreading becomes stable,
may be dependent upon deg(v). To characterize the impact of deg(v) on i∗v, we start with an ob-
servation. Since we want to reveal the relation between i∗v and deg(v), we treat it as if i∗v depends
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only on deg(v). This allows us to consider i∗(k), the probability any degree-k node is infected after
the spreading becomes stable. Suppose, for feasibility, all of v’s neighboring nodes have identical
infection rate as v, namely that i∗u ≈ i∗v for all u with (u, v) ∈ E. From master equation Eq. (3.2),
we have
i∗v =
[
1− (1− α)
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)
]
(1− i∗v) + (1 − β)i
∗
v
≈
[
1− (1− α)(1 − γi∗v)
k
]
(1 − i∗v) + (1 − β)i
∗
v. (5.1)
Hence, solution to the following equation
βi∗(k) =
[
1− (1− α)(1 − γi∗(k))k
]
(1− i∗(k)) (5.2)
is the probability that any degree-k node is infected. In other words, solution to the following equa-
tion approximates i∗(k):
βx = [1− (1− α)(1 − γx)k](1− x) (5.3)
for each k = 1, 2, · · · ,maxv∈V {deg(v)}. We observe that Eq. (5.3) can be numerically solved
using (for example) Matlab.
In order to evaluate the above approximation-based analytic heuristics, we conducted a simula-
tion study. In order to attest the applicability of the heuristics, we further used, in addition to the
aforementioned Epinions and Enron datasets, the following datasets which vary in network topology
and/or size:
— Oregon autonomous system dataset: This is an undirected graph of real-life network con-
nections between Internet autonomous systems. The dataset is obtained from website http:
//topology.eecs.umich.edu/data.html. The graph has 11,461 nodes and 32,730
edges with average node degree 5.7115, maximal node degree 2,432, and largest eigenvalue
λ1,A = 75.2407. It also exhibits a power-law degree distribution.
— Power-law graphs: We used the Brite tool [Medina et al. 2001] to generate two synthetic undirected
power-law graphs. The small one has 2,000 nodes and 5,997 edges with average node degree
5.997, maximal node degree 90, and λ1,A = 11.6514. The large one has 37,000 nodes and 369,908
edges with average node degree 19.995, maximal node degree 1,530, and λ1 = 103.9362.
— Random graphs: We used two synthetic undirected Erdos-Renyi graphs. The small one has 2,000
nodes and 6,001 edges with average node degree 6.001, maximal node degree 16, and λ1,A =
7.1424. The large one has 37,000 nodes and 370,000 edges with average node degree 20, maximal
node degree 40, and λ1 = 21.0894.
— Regular graphs: The small synthetic undirected regular graph has 2,000 nodes and 6,000 edges
with node degree 6 and λ1,A = 6. The large synthetic undirected regular graph has 37,000 nodes
and 370,000 edges with node degree 20 and λ1 = 20.
In our simulations, we set α = 0.4, β = 0.6 and γ = 0.004, which always satisfy the sufficient
condition given in Theorem 4.3 and thus the spreading will become stable. We compare in Figures
4-5 the i∗(k) obtained from simulation and the i∗(k) obtained by solving Eq. (5.3). In each case,
the x-axis represents degree k = 1, . . . ,max{deg(v)}, and the y-axis represents simulation-based
i∗(k) (+ in red color), which is obtained by averaging (over 100 simulation runs) the i∗v’s of the
degree-k nodes after the spreading becomes stable, and the i∗(k) obtained by numerically solving
Eq. (5.3) (× in black color).
In the case of both real and synthetic power-law graphs (cf. Figure 4) the numerical results fit the
simulation results pretty well, although not perfect. This means that the approximation-based Eq.
(5.3) could be used in practice. On the other hand, we observe some intriguing phenomena.
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(b) Enron dataset (large)
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(c) Oregon dataset (large)
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(d) Power-law graph (large)
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(e) Power-law graph (small)
Fig. 4. On the accuracy of the approximation: Real and synthetic power-law graphs
— In the large real or synthetic power-law graphs (Figures 4(a)-4(d)), node degree k has a non-linear
factor on the nodes’ infection rate i∗(k). Whereas, for the small one (Figure 4(e)), node degree has
a linear factor on i∗(k). How can we interpret this discrepancy? We observe that the non-linearity
appears to be proportional to the range of the node degrees. For example, the non-linearity in
Figure 4(d) appears to be in between, so is its node degree interval. This phenomenon arguably
can be explained as that a non-linear function could seem linear in a sufficiently small local region
(e.g., degree range [1, 250] in Figures 4(a)-4(d)).
— We observe that for sufficient large degree k (e.g., when k > 1, 000), i∗(k) becomes almost flat.
This can be explained as follows. We observe that the asymptotic limit limk→∞ i∗(k) = 1/(1+β),
which means that the variation of the slopes of the non-linear curves vanishes rapidly and thus the
curves look flat because (for example) the limit value is 0.635 for β = 0.6.
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(a) Random graph (large)
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Fig. 5. On the accuracy of the approximation: Synthetic random graphs
In the case of synthetic Erdos-Renyi random graphs (Figure 5), the numerical results and the
simulation results agree to a large extent. We observe that node degree k has a linear factor on
i∗(k). Similar to the case of power-law graphs, this might be caused by the fact that the degrees are
densely concentrated on a small interval, in which a non-linear function could be approximated as
a linear one.
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In the case of synthetic regular graphs, we report that the numerical results and the simulation
results match nicely. We did not plot the figures because there is only a single point in each figure,
which does not offer any extra value.
In summary, we draw the following:
INSIGHT 1. Node degree plays an essential role in governing node infection rate. Moreover,
Eq. (5.3) is a reasonably good approximation of i∗(k), which means that one could use Eq. (5.3) to
estimate i∗(k) for given parameters.
5.2. Condition under Which the Mean Field Approach Is Accurate
In this subsection, we will provide further analyses of the push- and pull-based epidemic models
using the well-known mean field approach, which is a Statistical Physics method introduced for
the purpose of studying stochastic particle systems [Chandler 1987]. Roughly speaking, the mean
field approach is to use the mean (expectation) to stand for stochastic interactions. Mathematically
speaking, it can be seen as the first-order approximation of random variables. To be concrete, we
here give a simple example. Suppose that a variable w is influenced by its random environment,
which is described by a variable x, via a scheme h. That is, w = h(x). By Taylor expansion, we
have
w = h(x) = h(〈x〉) + h′(〈x〉)(x − 〈x〉) + o(|x − 〈x〉|),
where 〈·〉 stands for the expectation (mean). By omitting the higher-order terms and conducting
expectation on both sides, we have an approximation 〈w〉 = h(〈x〉). This highlights the basic idea
of the mean field approach: replacing a random field with its mean field.
The mean field approach also has become an important method for understanding complex dy-
namics. In general, this method is however not applicable in our setting because of the arbitrary
network heterogeneity we accommodate. Therefore, it is natural to ask for conditions under which
the method is applicable. In what follows we address this question.
We first derive a formula to describe i¯, the global mean infection rate defined after the spreading
becomes stable,
i¯ = 〈i∗v〉 =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
i∗v =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
lim
t→∞
iv(t)
in Erdos-Renyi random graph with edge probability p. Recall the equation for the fixed point of
master equation Eq. (3.2):
βi∗v =

1− (1− α) ∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)

 (1− i∗v).
So, we have
βi¯ =
〈
1− (1 − α) ∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)

 (1 − i∗v)
〉
.
We use the following approximation to derive the right-hand side term:
〈
1− (1− α) ∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)

 (1− i∗v)
〉
≈

1− (1− α)
〈 ∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u)
〉
 (1− i¯).
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In Erdos-Renyi random graphs with edge probability p, every pair of nodes are linked with proba-
bility p. So, we can approximate the following term as〈 ∏
(u,v)∈E
(1 − γi∗u)
〉
≈ (1− γpi¯)n.
Let 〈k〉 represent the average degree. When γ〈k〉 is sufficiently small, we have
log[(1− γpi¯)n] = n log[1− γpi¯] ≈ −npγi¯ = −γ〈k〉¯i.
Thus, we have 〈 ∏
(u,v)∈E
(1 − γi∗u)
〉
≈ exp(−γ〈k〉¯i).
So, we have
βi¯ ≈ [1− (1 − α) exp(−〈k〉γi¯)](1 − i¯). (5.4)
Its solution is i¯(α, β, γ, 〈k〉). Although we are unable to derive its analytic expression, we can
calculate the solution numerically.
The above discussion was made for Erdos-Renyi random graphs with edge probability p with
small γ〈k〉. Can it be applied to other network topologies, perhaps under the condition γ〈k〉 is
small? To answer this question, we conduct simulation using some of the aforementioned datasets,
which are selected with a certain balance on network size and topology (three large real datasets,
three small synthetic datasets). Simulation results are based on the average of 50 runs.
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Fig. 6. Mean-field approximation via Eq. (5.4) (the curve) vs. simulation (the dots): β = 0.4 and γ = 0.004. Observe that
i¯ increases with respect to α in a concave fashion.
Figure 6 compares the i¯ derived from the simulation results after the spreading becomes stable
(the dots) and the numerical solution i¯ of Eq. (5.4) with fixed β = 0.4 and γ = 0.004. In the case of
the small synthetic Erdos-Renyi random graph, for which Eq. (5.4) was derived, we observe that the
simulation result and the numerical result match perfectly. Moreover, for the other network graphs,
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they also match nicely. In all cases, the global mean infection rate i¯ increases with respect to α in
a concave fashion. This means that in order to significantly lower the global mean infection rate,
α must be decreased substantially (e.g., from α = 0.6 down to α = 0.2). In other words, security
against pull-based infection such as “drive-by download” attacks must be substantially enhanced;
otherwise, the spreading will remain at a high level.
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Fig. 7. Mean-field approximation via Eq. (5.4) (the curve) vs. simulation (the dots): α = 0.1 and γ = 0.004. Observe that
i¯ decreases with respect to β in a convex fashion.
Figure 7 compares the i¯ derived from the simulation results after the spreading becomes stable
(the dots) and the numerical solution i¯ to Eq. (5.4) with fixed α = 0.1 and γ = 0.004. In the case
of Erdos-Renyi random graph, the simulation result and the numerical result match perfectly. For
other network graphs, they also match well. In all cases, the global mean infection rate i¯ decreases
with respect to β in a convex fashion. This means that in order to lower the global mean infection
rate significantly, β must be increased substantially (e.g., from β = 0.1 to β = 0.5). In other
words, reactive security mechanisms against push- and pull-based infections must be substantially
enhanced; otherwise, the spreading will remain at a relatively high level.
Figure 8 compares the i¯ derived from the simulation results after the spreading becomes stable
(the dots) and the numerical solution i¯ to Eq. (5.4) with fixed α = 0.1 and β = 0.4. In the case
of random graph, the simulation result agrees with the numerical result. This also applies to the
case of regular graph topology. In both cases, the global mean infection rate i¯ increases with respect
to γ in a somewhat linear fashion. However, for power-law topologies, simulation result matches
the numerical solution only when γ (therefore, γ〈k〉) is small; this confirms the condition under
which the mean field approach is applicable to arbitrary networks. In any case, we observe that
any enhancement in security mechanisms against spreading (e.g., blocking suspicious or malicious
sessions) will always have an almost linear impact on the mean infection rate. This is quite different
from the impact of α and β because it states that network-based defense is always effective.
The above discussions lead us to draw the following:
INSIGHT 2. The mean field approach is useful in the setting of arbitrarily heterogeneous net-
works when γ〈k〉 is small. Under this circumstances, we found that the impacts of the parameters
α, β, and γ are very different (as described above).
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Fig. 8. Mean-field approximation via Eq. (5.4) (the curve) vs. simulation results (the dots): α = 0.1 and β = 0.4. Observe
that i¯ increases with respect to γ in a somewhat linear fashion.
5.3. Peeking into Global Infection via Localized Monitoring
Estimating i¯ via localized monitoring with unknown parameters. In the above we showed that
when γ〈k〉 is small, solution to Eq. (5.4) is a good approximation of the global mean infection rate
i¯, Still, it requires to know the values of parameters α, β and γ. This naturally leads to another
question: What can we say or (how) can we obtain/approximate i¯ even if the parameters are not
known? In theory, we can derive i¯ by monitoring the entire network so as to count the number
of infected nodes at every time t. This is clearly infeasible in practice. It then becomes natural to
ask: How can we sample the network so as to approximate i¯ with a reasonable precision? Because
the states of the nodes are not independent of each other — rather they are correlated in a certain
delicate fashion as governed by the master equation Eq. (3.2), a reasonable sampling strategy must
take into consideration the evolution of the dynamics. In what follows we present such a result. To
our surprise, the sample size can be constant and independent of the size of the network in question.
Recall that i∗v be the infection rate of node v after the spreading becomes stable and i∗(k) be the
mean infection rate of the nodes with degree k. Then, we have
i∗(k) =
1
|{v : deg(v) = k}|
∑
deg(v)=k
i∗v = 〈i
∗
v| deg(v) = k〉v,
where 〈ξ(u)|Γ〉u denotes the conditional expectation of random variable ξ(u) over u ∈ V under
conditionΓ (the subscript u can be neglected if it is clear from the context). Recall Eq. (5.2), namely
the approximation
βi∗(k) ≈ [1− (1− α)(1 − γi∗(k))k](1− i∗(k)).
Thus, the global mean infection rate equals to the mean of i∗(k) over the degree distribution:
i¯ = 〈i∗v〉v = 〈i
∗(k)〉k,
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due to the property of conditional expectation that 〈ξ〉 = 〈〈ξ|η〉〉 for two arbitrary random variables
ξ and η. With linear approximation, we have
i∗(k) = i∗(〈k〉) +
di∗(k)
dk
(k − 〈k〉) + o(k − 〈k〉),
which leads to
i¯ = 〈i∗(k)〉k = i
∗(〈k〉) +
〈
di∗(k)
dk
(k − 〈k〉)
〉
k
+ 〈o(k − 〈k〉)〉k .
Neglecting the higher order terms, assuming〈
di∗(k)
dk
(k − 〈k〉)
〉
k
≈
〈
di∗(k)
dk
〉
k
〈(k − 〈k〉)〉k,
and because 〈k − 〈k〉〉k = 0, we have the following approximation
i¯ ≈ i∗(〈k〉).
This leads us to draw the following:
INSIGHT 3. We can measure (or approximate) i¯, the global mean infection rate in a network,
through the mean infection rate of the nodes with the average node degree of a network.
To confirm the above insight, we use simulation to compare the global mean infection rate i¯ and
the mean infection rate of the average-degree nodes, denoted by i¯avg. We plot the results in Figure
9. The parameters used for simulation are α = 0.4, β = 0.4 and γ = 0.001; in each of these cases,
the spreading is stable.
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Fig. 9. i¯(t) vs. i¯avg(t)
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Figure 9 does show that they are reasonably close to each other at the resolution of 10−2. The
above insight is useful not only because the number of nodes with the average degree is much
smaller than the total number of nodes, but also because we do not need to know the parameters
α, β and γ. In other words, it states that monitoring the nodes with the average degree is sufficient
to measure or approximate the global state of the network; this explains why we call it localized
monitoring.
Estimating i¯ via localized monitoring with further reduced sample size. While the above insight
is already very useful, we ask a further deeper question: What if the number of nodes with the
average degree is still large (e.g., thousands)? For example, in the case of Epinions dataset, there are
1,070 nodes (i.e., 1.41%) whose degrees equal to the average degree; in the case of Enron dataset,
there are 2,212 nodes (i.e., 6.03%) whose degrees equal to the average degree. Monitoring and
examining whether those nodes are compromised at every time t is still costly. Is it possible to
monitor even smaller number of nodes (ideally, constant number of nodes independent of the size
of the network)? In what follows we answer this question affirmatively.
For the purpose of further reducing the number of nodes to monitor, we need to find further
approximation to i∗(〈k〉). From the equations of the equilibrium:
βi∗v
1− i∗v
= 1− (1− α)
∏
(u,v)∈E
(1− γi∗u), v ∈ V, (5.5)
we know that the infection rate of node v depends on those of its neighboring nodes. For the same
reason, the infection rate of node u, which is a neighbor of node v, depends on the state of u’s
neighboring nodes. Thus, we can regard i∗v as a function of v’s second-order neighborhood, which
consists of nodes r such that r 6= v ∧ (r, u) ∈ E ∧ (u, v) ∈ E. More precisely, we define the
second-order degree of node v, denoted by 2deg(v), as
2deg(v) =
∑
u:(u,v)∈E
deg(u)− |{w : (w, v) ∈ E ∧ (v, w) ∈ E}|.
This means that when two different neighbors of node v have a common neighbor r besides v itself,
r’s contribution to the infection rate of v should be counted twice. This leads us to consider the
first and second order neighborhood of the nodes with the average degree 〈k〉. With the mean field
approach, we have the following approximation:
βi∗v
1− i∗v
≈ 1− (1− α)(1 − γ〈i∗u〉)
〈k〉
and
β〈i∗u|(u, v) ∈ E〉
1− 〈i∗u|(u, v) ∈ E〉
≈
〈
βi∗u
1− i∗u
∣∣∣∣ (u, v) ∈ E
〉
≈ 1− (1− α)(1 − γ〈i∗r〉r:r 6=v∧(r,u)∈E∧(u,v)∈E)
〈deg(u)|(u,v)∈E〉.
As a result, we can further approximately regard i∗v with deg(v) = 〈k〉 as a random variable over
2deg(v) = [〈deg(u)|(u, v) ∈ E〉u − 1] deg(v).
Assuming 〈i∗r |(r, u) ∈ E, (u, v) ∈ E, deg(v) = 〈k〉〉v = i∗v and letting i˜v = 〈i∗u|(u, v) ∈ E〉, we
have
βi∗v
1− i∗v
= 1− (1 − α)(1 − γi˜v)
〈k〉 and βi˜v
1− i˜v
= 1− (1− α)(1 − γi∗v)
k′
v ,
where
k′v =
2deg(v)
k
.
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Given the mean degree 〈k〉, we can regard i∗v as a function of random variable k′v, i.e., i∗v = f(k′)
for all v with deg(v) = k and for some function f(·). By a discussion similar to the above, we have
an approximation i¯ ≈ f(〈k′〉) = f(〈2deg(v)〉v:deg(v)=k/〈deg(v)〉). This means that we can select
the nodes whose degrees equal to 〈k〉 and second-order degrees equal to 〈2deg(v)|deg(v) = 〈k〉〉.
This leads us to draw the following insight, which allows to further reduce the sample size.
INSIGHT 4. We can approximate i¯, the global mean infection rate, by only monitoring the
nodes whose degrees equal to the average degree 〈k〉 and second-order degrees equal to
〈2deg(v)| deg(v) = 〈k〉〉.
The above insight statistically states that if there are no or few nodes whose degrees and second-
order degrees satisfy the requirements, then we can select the nodes whose degrees and second-
degree degrees are close to the respective average degrees. Because the insights do not specify how
large the reduced sample should be, in what follows we use simulation to demonstrate how large
the samples need be.
Let 2avg-x denote the set of x nodes whose degrees equal to the average degree and second-order
degrees are the closest to 〈2deg(v)| deg(v) = 〈k〉〉. We note that there are two ways to approximate
i¯ via i¯2avg-x.
— Approximating i¯[t0, t1] = 1t1−t0+1
∑
t∈[t0,t1]
i¯(t) as i¯2avg-x[t0, t1] =
1
t1−t0+1
∑
t∈[t0,t1]
∑
w∈2avg-x iw(t). This approximation is meaningful because the former
captures the global mean infection rate averaged over time interval [t0, t1] and the latter captures
the mean infection rate of the x sampled nodes over the same period of time. Note that t0 > 0 is
used because we deal with the situation after the spreading becomes stable; our simulation result
indicates that t0 can be no greater than 10.
— Approximating i¯(t) via i¯2avg-x[t0, t] = 1t−t0+1
∑
t∈[t0,t]
∑
w∈2avg-x iw(t). This approximation is
useful and interesting because the latter captures the “history” of the small samples, which can
actually approximate a certain index of the whole network.
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Fig. 10. i¯2avg-x[10, 190]− i¯[10, 190]
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Corresponding to the first type of approximation mentioned above, Figure 10 plots i¯2avg-x[t0, t1]−
i¯[t0, t1] over time interval [t0, t1] = [10, 190] (with step-length 10) based on our simulation study,
where x ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256} nodes are selected as indicated above. We observe that in
all the plotted network graphs, 16 nodes are enough to form a sufficiently accurate sample. What is
surprising is that it seems a constant size of samples is sufficient, regardless of the size of the graph.
It is an exciting future work to analytically explain this phenomenon.
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Fig. 11. i¯2avg-x[10, t] vs. i¯(t)
Corresponding to the second type of approximation mentioned above, Figure 11 plots i¯2avg-x[t0, t]
vs. i¯(t), where t0 = 10, t = 20, 30, . . . , 200, and x ∈ {2, 8, 32} nodes are selected as indicated
above. Note that the accuracy shown in Figure 11 is not as good as the accuracy shown in Figure
10. This is because Figure 10 corresponds to the average over time interval [10, 190], where the
comparison is between i¯[10, 190] and i¯2avg-x[10, 190]; whereas, Figure 11 corresponds to i¯(t) and
i¯2avg-x[10, t] for t = 10, 20, . . . , 190. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 11, for moderate t (e.g.,
t = 120), the prediction of future is with reasonable accuracy. This leads to the following:
INSIGHT 5. The accumulative observations obtained from monitoring certain constant number
of nodes (selected as mentioned above; e.g., monitoring 32 nodes as shown in Figure 11) allow to
estimate the current global mean infection rate i¯(t) with a pretty good accuracy.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We rigorously investigated a push- and pull-based epidemic spreading model in arbitrary networks.
We presented sufficient conditions or epidemic thresholds under which the spreading will become
stable (but not dying out). The conditions supersede the relevant ones offered in the literature. Our
investigation leads to further insights regarding the characterization of the role of node degree in
governing node infection rate, the characterization of a condition under which the mean field ap-
proach is applicable in arbitrary networks, and a sampling strategy for selecting a small number of
nodes to monitor so as to estimate the global mean infection rate without knowing the values of the
parameters.
There are many exciting research problems from both theoretic and practical points of view. In
addition to those mentioned in the text, here we highlight the following. First, how can we precisely
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pinning down the equilibrium states in the general case of α > 0? Second, can we have tighter
bounds especially when the spreading is not stable? Third, can we statistically prove that the sample
size can be constant and thus independent of the size of the network (as indicated by our empirical
study)? Fourth, can we design sampling algorithms to sample the nodes without knowing the net-
work topology (our characterization demonstrates their existence but requires the knowledge of the
global network)?
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